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Head and heart, thinking and feeling, rationality and emotions: we have lots of ways of dividing human life into two opposed categories, and many of us might assume that philosophy is firmly on the ‘head’ side of the divide. But philosophers have had a lot of interesting things to say about emotions over the centuries, and in recent decades, especially, new perspectives have emerged about the nature of emotions, and role that emotional responsiveness might play in the deepest kind of moral reflection and action.
In this course, we will look at a few classic philosophical accounts of emotions, before diving into some more recent debates about the role of emotions in moral life. We’ll examine why it has been so difficult to give a clear account of what emotions are; the idea of emotions as forms of evaluation; the role of emotions in action. Towards the end of the course, we will look at two clusters of questions about particular emotions, and their role in our lives: resentment and blame; empathy and compassion.
Ask anyone if they know what an emotion is, and they are likely to say yes. We know what emotions are because we have them, or feel them, or experience them. But it is surprisingly difficult to be clear about what emotions are, or how to articulate their distinctive nature. To answer the question of what emotions are normally involves situating emotions within some broader account of human being, or in terms of some other aspect of human life and experience. This means that philosophical history is full of attempts to characterise emotion, along with its difference from and connections to other aspects of our own nature. In this session, we will explore a few of the big questions, focusing on some of the most influential ways of answering the question that have been put forward in modern philosophy.
Reading:
‘The Philosophy of Emotions’ by Robert C. Solomon in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Lewis, Haviland-Jones and Barrett (2008).
In this session, we explore the idea that we should understand emotion in terms of evaluation; in Martha Nussbaum’s terms: ‘emotions are forms of evaluative judgement that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person’s own control great importance for the person’s own flourishing’. This means that emotions should be understood in terms of their intentional objects, as well as their distinctive affective ‘feel’. For example, grief is a form of recognition that someone or something of great value to oneself has been lost. We will exploresome of the strengths, as well as difficulties, with this family of views. We will also explore the thought that emotions themselves can be evaluated for their ‘fittingness’: some kinds of anger are excessive, or inappropriate; some kinds of fear are irrational, etc. In the process we will look at Aristotle, Hume, Nietzsche and Nussbaum.
Reading:
‘Emotions as judgements of value and importance’ from Thinking about Feelings, ed. Solomon. (pdf at the bottom of the screen)
In this session we explore two issues. Firstly, what is the place of action and motivation in understanding what emotions are? Does it make sense to say that emotions are defined in terms of motivation? For example: that to be afraid to want to avoid some danger; to be angry is to desire payback in some way? Secondly, how should we situate the motivational dimension of emotions in relation to moral life? One influential account of ethics – that of Immanuel Kant, and those influenced by him – says that moral life involves acting from duty. That is, being motivated by the thought that a given action is the right one. This approach goes along with a suspicion of the role of emotions in moral life: we can sometimes do the right thing for the wrong reasons (for example, out of fear, or self-interest, etc.), and we often fail to do the right thing, apparently, because of our emotion-linked motivations (e.g. to hide when we should speak up).
Reading:
Christine Tappolet, ‘Emotion, motivation and action: the case of fear’ in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (ed. Goldie).
This week we look at anger and resentment. Anger seems like a fairly uncontroversial candidate for being classed as an emotion. ‘Resentment’, however, seems more complex, and sometimes the term ‘attitude’ is preferred. The moral value of anger has been hotly disputed in recent decades: on one side, there is the claim that anger is a necessary energy in the combatting of injustice; on the other, the claim that anger distorts perspective and perpetuates grievances. When it comes to resentment, there are interesting questions to ask about the connection between resentment and the very concept of moral blame: could we articulate what it is to be morally blameworthy without the idea of warranted, or appropriate, blame? We explore these issues, paying particular attention to Joseph Butler’s influential 18th century sermons, Martha Nussbaum’s recent work, and a number of discussions of forgiveness.
Reading:
Ernesto V. Garcia , Bishop Butler on Forgiveness and Resentment
Also relevant:
Lucy Allais, Elective Forgiveness
To conclude, we consider the role of compassion in moral life. We begin in the 18th century, when Hume, Butler and Smith all reflected on the moral significance of this ‘passion’. We also consider the way that Schopenhauer and then Nietzsche viewed compassion, in the 19th century, before looking at some more recent reflections from Weil, Gaita and Darwall.
Reading:
Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part 1, section 1: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/smith1759_1.pdf
Joseph Butler, Sermon V ‘Upon compassion’: https://www.ccel.org/ccel/b/butler/sermons/cache/sermons.pdf
Additional reading:
Stephen Darwall, ‘Empathy, Sympathy, Care’: https://backend.production.deepblue-documents.lib.umich.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/7db43c9f-cc36-4ab7-9f81-77b84723d803/content
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Stuart is the Theology Lead at LJC. He graduated with a degree in Literature and Theology from the University of Hull in 2000. From 2003-9 he studied Philosophical Theology part-time at the University of Nottingham, whilst continuing to work in the third sector with vulnerably-housed or homeless people, and young asylum seekers (as well as pulling pints in a pub). He was Lecturer at York St John University for almost a decade, before moving to London Jesuit Centre in 2021. He now lives in South East London, and spends as much time as he can in the woods.
